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A REVIEW OF THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL*

Lenore B. Stoughtont
HE United States Trade-.Mark Act of July 5, 1946, is a statute
designed to be of far-reaching effect. The appraisal of the statute
must be made in the light of that fact rather than in the light of the
confusion and disputation which have arisen as to the proper interpretation of many of its provisions.
One might have supposed that an act which had been subject~d
to intensive study and extensive revision over .so many years before its
final enactment would emerge in complete clarity. Such has not proved
to be the case; and it should not have been expected. The very variety
of trade-mark problems makes it obviously impossible to put into a
single document a definite answer to every one of them.
Some of the confusion and concern about the -effects of the act is
due to last-minute Congressional Committee amendments. Some may
be due to a common failing in the drafting of documents of this kind.
Every lawyer occasionally has the experience of working on a draft
so long, of getting his intent so firmly fixed in his own mind, that he
loses sight of inaccuracies and ambiguities in his language and is surprised that others do not find in it the exact meaning it was intended
to express. Something of that bas undoubtedly happened here. But the
most meticulous wording and most careful scrutiny could not have
obviated all the specific questions which have been brought forwarcf
since the passage of this act.
In the continuing discussion of its construction and practical application divergent views on both major and minor points are constantly
heard. Trade-mark lawyers preparing to advise their clients in relation
to the act realize more and more how much of ,its eventual operation
and effect in particular circumstances will depend upon interpretation
by the Patent Office and the courts.
Complete clarification by authoritative judicial interpretation will
be a long time coming, if it is ever to be attained at all. "Pioneering''
cases on dubious points will be watched with great interest. Venturesome litigants will pioneer; conservatives will prefer to await develop-
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ments in others' cases. But even the most conservative will be neither
able nor willing to postpone all action under the new act until it has
been completely construed. For them, as for the pioneers, The New
Trade-Mark Manual by Daphne Robert will serve as a useful reference and guide.
In her preface to the Manual, Miss Robert disclaims any attempt
to make it a "complete discourse" on the law of trade-marks and unfair practice. She says it is merely an analysis of the act, with case citations and excerpts from the legislative history which may be of assistance in interpreting its provisions. The material to which she thus
refers do_es add much to pne's understanding of the intent and development of various parts of the act. But Miss Robert is very well qualified
to accomplish the purpose without reference to other authority, for
to a background of practical work in the trade-mark field she has added
a vast amount of study and participation in the drafting of the act, and
a .close acquaintance with its legislative course.
The result is a well-constructed book of real usefulness to be read
as a complete text or to be kept at hand for convenient occasional reference on specific points. The subject matter is arranged in logical sequence and separate sections, and each section is complete in itself.
While this requires some unavoidable repetition, it also facilitates reference use by making all the information on one topic available as a
whole. In her discussion the author points out a number of sections
where final interpretation or determination by the courts will be necessary. Sometimes she suggests what a logical determination may be, but
generally she confines herself to pointing out the problem without expressing any personal views on its proper solution.
For most readers the meat of the Manual may be found in its
chapters dealing with the effects of registration and the remedies for
trade-mark infringement and unfair competition. As a preliminary to
the whole book, but to those chapters particularly, one would be well
advised to turn first to the Introdvction, written by Edward S. Rogers.
It offers an interesting and enlightening discussion of the economic
philosophy of trade-marks and unfair competition.
_
In his long career in this field of law, Mr. Rogers has contributed
much to the crystallization of modern theory and to the adaptation
of traditional principles to today's complexities. He now suggests that
the new act, with its broad grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts
in cases of this kind, has set up a-better bulwark than our citizens have
ever before had for effective protection, and_ that the embodiment of.
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the Convention provisions for the repression of unfair competition ( as
distinguished from purely trade-mark questions) is a long-overdue
advance in our statutory law.
But the Manual does not plunge immediately into such weighty
questions as these. It opens with chapters on the primary principles
affecti~g trade-marks and the concomitant classes of service, collective,
and certification marks, and embracing such topics as the choice of
marks, their functions, the manner and extent of acquisition of rights
in them, the possibilities of loss of the rights, and differences between
the old acts and the new one in these respects. In these chapters will be
found references to many uncertainties which are yet to be resolved,
including such important questions as the sphere of the "commerce"
regulated by the act, the extent of association which will be requir.ed
for a claim of registrable right in a mark used only in displays "associated" with the goods, and the line of distinction between certification
marks and collective marks.
Considerable attention is given to various questions of assignment
of a mark and the necessary passing of good will to support the assignment. There are queries as to the propriety of separation of marks
which have been used together, and the possibility of territorial assignments. Special mention is made of the new provision for assignment
with only that part of the owner's good will which is connected with
and symbolized by the mark. But that perhaps is a change more apparent in language than real in effect, for such assignments have long
been a common practice even though not within the strict letter of the
earlier act. The new language is a recognition of the practice, and of
the fact that the good will is an appendage to the mark, not the mark
to the good will.
In the discussion of the types of marks eligible for the Principal
Register, several questions appear. One of the most interesting and
most troublesome has to do with "service" marks used in radio advertising. As Miss Robert reminds us, the view was advanced in the course
of hearings that identifying features of radio programs, such as theme
songs br the well-known jargon of the Lucky Strike tobacco auctioneer,
should be protected. There seems to have beea ·no unanimity of opinion
at that time, but since the passage of the act the Commissioner of Patents himself has said that apparently it can be done. He did confess,
however, that he "somewhat trembles" at the thought of what to do
when someone attempts to register such distinctive but intangible
features.
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The loose definition of a service mark leaves considerable room for
interpretation in other respects as well. Probably this is preferable to
an overly-narrow limitation in a newly recognized field. Still it is to be
hoped that efforts to give the term an adequate scope will not carry
liberality to the point of absurdity. With the new provisions available
for ·the repression of unfair competition, there seems no occasion to
stretch the limits for registration beyond a reasonable and practicable
point.
The provision for concurrent registrations is another new subject
of wide interest. The act offers registration of "concurrent lawful use"
only to a use begun prior to' the filing date of an application for registration by another. Is this enough to be completely just? Experience
has shown us· that there may be a Jong lapse between the filing of an
application and its publication. During that interval another party,
having no notice of the application, may in all innocence build up a
concurrent use. Yet even though the second use be such. that there is
no likelihood of "confusion or mistake or deceit of purchasers," it will
not be accorded the benefit of registration. It may be wise to add to
the substantive rights of the first applicant in this way. Certainly it
gives him protection for a period of expansion in the development of
a new business. But one who has been trained in the earlier precepts
of limitation of the right to' the existing trade~ may find a little difficulty in accepting the new principle.
· There is no such difficulty in accepting and approving the new language for the old "confusion in trade" clause which prohibited registration of similar marks only when applied to "merchandise of the same
descriptive properties." No one seems to mourn the passing of that
phrase. The Patent Office and the courts have struggled with it for
more than forty years. Sometimes 'they have bowed to the. technical
limitations implied in it; sometimes they have taken a realistic view
less in accord with the strict letter of the statute. Hence their conclusions are, as Miss Robert observes, "irreconcilable and in such conflict
that the phrase has be~n rendered almost meaningless." They range
from holdings that if the goods are not of the same descriptive properties there can be no likelihood of confusion in the statutory senseregardless of other facts-to holdings that if there is a likelihood of
confusion the goods must be of the same descriptive properties-regardless of other facts.
The latter conclusion may more often lead to a fair disposition of
a particular case, but it requires reasoning "from the effect to the ·
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cause" to achieve it, and that course has not been uniformly followed.
The new standard of proscribed similarity-based only on the likelihood of confusion or mistake or deception of purchasers-will greatly
simplify the prosecution of some cases. Perhaps it will complicate others
by necessitating more forceful proof of the circumstances which make
confusion likely. Surely, though, it ·will prove on the whole to be a
better measure of justice.
As to the Supplemental Register, the Manual points out that it
corrects many of the deficiencies of the r 920 act which have become
apparent through its administration. One of the important changes
lies in the general statement of what may be registered. The new act,
unlike the r 920 act, requires that the mark be "capable of distinguishing'' applicant's goods or services. Wise administration will
clearly be required to avoid pitfalls in determining what marks not of
sufficient distinctiveness for the Principal Register are nevertheless
"capable of distinguishing'' within the purview of the act. It will be
interesting to watch the development of general criteria or specific interpretations, and also to learn what weight, if any, such a registration
will lend in support of a later application on the Principal Register on
the basis of acquired distinctiveness through use.
Chapter 8, dealing with international registrations, is of special
interest because of its full discussion gf Convention provisions and history. Though the provisions have long been part of our law, they have
rarely been the subject of judicial consideration in this country; and
the absence of statutory references to them has caused them to be of little or no general familiarity. Their inclusion in the new act is more
than a novelty. It is a matter of considerable importance in our international relations. The previous failure to incorporate the Convention
provisions in our statutes has caused much misunderstanding among
foreign nationals who have therefore supposed the provisions to be
ineffective here.
The chapter on registration procedure is a simple and practical outline, as complete in detail as is possible in advance of the issuance of
office rules and forms, and includes a discussion of interference and
opposition proceedings. Both here and in the chapter dealing with effects of registration, the author presents the thesis that, since equitable
rights may be considered and determined in such proceedings under
the new act, the Patent Office tribunals will hereafter be acting as
quasi-judicial bodies rather than as mere administrative agencies.
Miss Robert declines to predict whether the decisions of these
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tribunals will be regarded as res judicata in subsequent Court proceedings, but argues that they should be entitled to more than "great
weight," because "there would seem to be little justification for a Court
to try the same issues on substantially the same facts with the same defenses available. . . ." 1 This is a plausible app~opriation of a sound
general principle; yet it has disturbing aspects too. For example, if
a finding of registrability is to carry such weight, may it not impede
the exercise of the authority which the act gives to the Courts to make
a later rectification of the register?
There is an important discussion of the effect of the new act on
existing registrations granted under the acts of 1881 and 1905. These ·
two classes of registration are treated on the same basis under the new
act. Both are entitled to renewal on an affidavit of continuing use. Both
are given certain specific benefits, such as the "constructive notice" provision and the permission to use the new registration, symbol. There
has, however, been some doubt as to the exact extent of the application
of general provisions to them, in view of the language in section 46 (b)
giving them the same force and effect as though registered under the
new act, "except as limited in sections 8, 12, 14 and 15 of this Act."
Section 12 ( c) provides that a registrant under the act of I 881 or
1905 may file an affidavit stating that lie claims the benefit of the new
act for his mark. Some take this to mean that no benefits accrue to the
registration, except those explicitly granted, unless the affidavit is
filed. Others, including Miss Robert, believe that the only limitation
upon the benefits conferred without the formal claim is that no "incontestable" right may be acquired, with its ensuing advantages.
A large part ,of the chapter on the effect of registration under the
new act is given over to this subject of "incontestability." It is safe to
say that no other provision of the act has caused so much talk with so
little agreement as to its ultimate significance. The history given in the
Manual shows how far the provision as enacted departed from the
original suggestion for it. Safeguards against too broad a grant were
thought to be necessary. Unfortunately the safeguards which were
finally deemed "adequate" seem to have destroyed most of the substance of incontestability.
There is no better commentary on the situation than Miss Robert's
own statement:
"On its face, it would appear this provision means that at
1

Page

132.
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some time the title to the property right in the mark is quieted
and the rights of the registrant are forever secure. That the word
'incontestable' was not an altogether happy selection is demonstrated by enumerating the circumstances under which the right
may be limited, forfeited, or lost." 2
Both circumstances in which "incontestability" may be valuable,
and conditions under which it may cease to exist, are canvassed in detail in the Manual; and a distinction is drawn between conditions under
which merely the incontestability is lost and those in which the whole
right to the mark is lost. This involves a careful analysis of the extent
of the effect of the various "defenses or defects" under which the certificate ceases to be conclusive evidence and the registration therefore
ceases to be incontestable.
By and large, the establishment of a statutory defense or defect
would seem not merely to destroy the incontestability, but to go a
long way toward destroying either the right or the possibility of enforcing it. The whole question is one which will bear much study, and
the judicial construction and application of the principles involved will
be essential in a final evaluation. It is Miss Robert's conclusion, however, that "if all of the conditions and circumstances of the 'incontestable' right can be satisfied, there undoubtedly is real substance in such
registrations." 8
·
The preliminary discussion of remedies under the act touches on
confusion as the basis of infringement-in contrast to the old criterion
of descriptive properties,--on the theory of expansion of business, and
on the broader law of unfair competition. The latter, the author says,
is really, "in a proper sense, common law infringement of trademarks"-not concerned with confusion of goods or source, but arising
from deception of the public or misrepresentation of facts in some other
respect. For example, infringement in the strict sense of the word may
arise from the means by which a false implication of sponsorship, approval, or trade connection is made ( though the result will be remediable whether or not it is a trade-mark infringement), but infringement
in the statutory sense probably does not include mere dilution of the
"uniqueness or singularity" of a mark.
Such dilution is mentioned instead as an unfair trade practice, and
that broad cla~s of practices is also said to include such acts as actual
2

8
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passing off, the use of a confusing trade or commercial name, copying
of labels or packages, or featur!!S of appearance of the goods, factual
misrepresentations having a disparaging effect upon another's business,
betrayal of trade secrets, and intereference with the free and normal
development of another's -business. All of these are treated in the
Manual as "acts of ·unfair competition" within the purview of the act.
All of them have been remediable to some extent under common law
principles, but have never before been covered by the statute.
The provision for action against the use of false trade descriptions
· and false designations of origin is commonly thought of as an innovation too, because so little recourse has been had to the earlier provision
of similar import in the I 920 act. That was often of little avail because
it required a showingthat the use was made "willfully and with intent
to deceive," and a remedy was more frequently sought under general
common-law principles. Now a definite right of action is given to
"any person doing business in the localityP or "any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation," without the burden of proving intent. The
effectiveness of this phase of the new act and its eventual importance
in the trade field may depend largely upon the judicial handling of it
in early cases. If it is not-liberally applied, reliance upon it may be
discouraged. If it does prove useful as a basis for a private action, it
may dispose of many misrepresentations which can now be reached only
through a proceeding by the Federal Trade Commission.
A right of action which really is new in the statute is that provided
for the protection of trade or commercial names. Such names are not
now registerable and will not be under the new act. Some protection
for them has been available under the common law. The statutory
recognition given without the obligation to file or register them conforms largely, as Miss Robert points out, to Convention provisions, but
probably does not go beyo-nd the relief previously· accorded under our
decisional law. It does, however, make ~he relief available in "an action
under the Act," with whatever advantages that may give in a procedural sense.
It is hoped that in all these types of cases the new act has resolved
some of the difficulties formerly encountered .by the federal courts in
taking jurisdiction and finding appropriate remedies within their power
to apply. The jurisdiction of state courts in actions under the act is
not entirely clear. It was obviously not contemplated by the provision
of section 34 for service and enforcement of an injunction ih a district
other than that in which it was issued; and if only for that reason a
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plaintiff may prefer the federal court as his forum. But Miss Robert
thinks it is doubtful whether the jurisdiction of the federal courts is
exclusive, and cites various general authorities supporting a view that
the state courts do have concurrent jurisdiction.
She also suggests, by reference to the established scope of the National Labor Relations Act, that the provisions of this act for the protection of a mark used "in commerce" may not be defeated by state
law, either decisional or statutory, and that they give a rig, lt of action
under the act against an infringing mark of solely intrastate use. The
act relates to "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress," and Miss Robert says that "this seems unquestionably to include
commerce which burdens, obstructs, or interferes with the free flow
of interstate or foreign commerce." 4 Admittedly this is a matter yet
to be determined by the courts, but the discussion in the Manual r<J.ises
an interesting question and one which may become exceedingly important if any ~f the states should attempt to protect intrastate marks
by law conflicting with the federal act.
Of course no consideration of actions under the act would be complete without reference to the available defenses, and the Manual
covers them quite fully. One section is devoted to !aches, acquiescence,
alfand;nment, and estoppel, with illustrations from past cases. The act's
explicit recognition of the equitable principles should be an emphatic
warning to all trade-mark owners to exercise the vigilance necessary
to retain as well as to obtain their rights.
Another section on defenses relates to inequitable conduct or "unclean hands." This is not included in the statutory provisions for Patent
Office proceedings except insofar as it may be involved in obtaining a
registration pr an incontestable right fraudulently. Section 33 (b) ( 7)
does add another type of misconduct to be considered, by making it a
defense or defect "that the mark has been or is being used to violate
the antitrust laws of the United States." Those who have been apprehensive about the use and effect of this provision, however, will be
comforted by Miss Robert's explanation. Her conclusion is that such
a defense or defect never has been and is not now a good defense on
the merits of an infringement question. Rather, it runs only to the
weight of a registration as conclusive evidence of incontestable right.
It serves not to destroy the right, but only to shift the burden of proof
with respect to it.
The extent of relief provided by the act in most respects does not
go beyond that afforded under the earlier statutes. Nothing has been
4
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taken away; the changes are in the direction of enlargement. One new
feature is the permissive provision for a compliance report to follow
an injunction. This may prove to be extremely useful, for, as Miss
Robert comments, it will provide means for an early court review of
new marks or labels without the necessity of a contempt proceeding to
determine whether they are in violation of the inj~ction.
·
Other innovations are the requirement for court clerks to notify
the commissioner of actions affecting specific registrations, so that the
Patent Office record_s may reflect litigation as well as registration, and
the broadened authority to the court to rectify the register with respect
to the registrations of any party to the action. These and other elements
of relief are fully discussed in the Manual, and the statement of the
remedy against infringing importations is helpfully amplified by an
outline of customs procedure upon the detention of such goods.
Cancellation is treated separately in the chapter on remedies, with
particular attention to the new authority of the Federal Trade Commission to apply for cancellation on some of the statutory grounds. The
author of the Manual takes an uncommonly cheerful view of this provision. She says that "on analysis the undesirability is minimized," and
asks," ... if a mark is improperly on the register, what is the difference
whether a private petitioner or a public agency causes it to be eliminated?" 5 Nevertheless there are those who would like a firmer assurance against possible misuse of the commissioner's power to bring a cancellation proceeding, even though the defending party can rely upon
fair determination of the issues in the Patent Office.
The text of the Manual concludes with a brief chapter on the status
of unregistered marks and the "checkerboard" of rights and remedies
relating to them, and an informative chapter on the history of trademark laws. Here are traced the legislative enactments from the act of
July 8, 1870 onward, with a well-considered tribute to Mr. Lanham
for the great part he played in the adoption of the new act.
The discussion throughout the Manual is generously annotated,
and is usefully augmented by a comprehensive Appendix containing,
among other material, the full text of this act and various others, the
pertinent conventions, the legislative reports, and Mr. Lanham's own
statement preceding the House adoption of the Conference Report on
the final version of the act. This is a valuable book in an important
field.
5
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